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The past few years have witnessed a trend of increased delegation of authority 
to central banks. Increasing central bank independence is a recommended 
strategy for governments to establish a credible commitment to price stability as 
the final objective of the monetary authority, even at the cost of other objectives 
that may be more appealing to the political authorities. Existing literature on 
measuring central bank independence focuses on developed countries where 
quantifying the independence of central banks is easier, since quantifying the 
legal charter is sufficient to reflect the degree of central bank independence. 
However, in developing countries this task is thorny as quantifying the legal 
charter is often insufficient, since laws are often incomplete, ambiguous, or 
simply not respected. Thus, quantifying other indicators that reflect actual 
practice is required to capture any divergence between legal and actual 
practices. This paper attempts to quantify the degree of independence in the 
central bank of Egypt (CBE), from both a legal and behavioural context, since its 
establishment in 1961 until 2004. The study uses four indices in line with the 
work of Jacome (2001), Cukierman, et al. (1992), and Cukierman and Webb 
(1995), where each index is designed in such a way to capture a somewhat 
different aspect of independence. This study captures the discrepancies between 
the degree of independence conferred to the CBE by law and actual practice. The 
empirical findings of this paper offers insights about the direction of efforts that 
should be made to enhance central bank independence which is the key to 
achieving price stability and the stability of the financial system in general. 
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I. Introduction and Motivation 
    
The concept of central bank independence
1 (CBI) can be viewed as granting the central bank 
(CB) a mandate as well as an authority to pursue price stability as its primary objective 
(Cukierman et al., 1992). Still CBI is far from being an unambiguous concept. This ambiguity 
arises from the fact that there are several kinds of independence: political and economic, de-
jure and de-facto, constitutional and statutory, independence within and independence from the 
government, strategic (to formulate policy) and tactical (day-to-day operations), instrument 
independence but not goal independence (Debelle and Fisher, 1994), and independence of the 
executive, judiciary, and legislative (Chandavarkar, 1996). In addition, independence 
encompasses various degrees, ranging from the Bundesbank with broad goal independence to 
the Bank of New-Zealand with partial goal independence (Cukierman, 1996).  
    
The question that imposes itself is why do governments willingly (and increasingly) delegate 
more authority to CBs? Two cases, the theoretical and the empirical cases, help to answer this 
question. The theoretical case for CBI advocates its independence of political authority 
primarily as a countervailing power against the alleged "inflationary bias" of the executive and 
legislative authority (Rogoff, 1985). This bias of governments is explained by three motives: 
the seigniorage revenue motive, the employment motive, and the balance of payments motive 
(Cukierman, 1992). On the other hand, the empirical case for CBI is supported by a growing 
body of empirical evidence showing that, on average, countries with more independent CBs 
have lower rates of inflation, and either the same or higher rates of growth of per capita output. 
Based on this evidence the conclusion reached was that, for industrialized economies, CBI 
offers a "Free Lunch"
2(Grilli et al., 1991), while for developing countries there appears a 
positive relation between growth and behavioural CBI (Cukierman, 1996). 
 
It follows that behind the recent dramatic acceleration
3 in delegation of legal authority to CBs 
is an increased quest for price stability that arises due to two main factors: First, following the 
stagflation of the 1970s and the weak economic performance of some high inflation countries, 
in Latin America and elsewhere, the conventional wisdom concerning inflation and real 
growth has changed, where the accepted view became that inflation and its associated 
uncertainties retard growth. Also, the good economic performance of some countries with 
highly independent and conservative CBs such as the Bundesbank and the Swiss National 
Bank set a very good record in achieving price stability which provided added impetus to the 
previous view. Second, the increasing crucial role of international capital inflows for the 
economy of developing countries raised the importance of price stability to signal credit 
worthiness. 
 
There have been only a few studies attempting to quantify CBI especially in developing 
countries, perhaps because in developed countries the task of quantifying the independence of 
                                                 
1 In the empirical studies, emphasis on price stability and freedom to pursue this goal are primary determinants of 
independence. In the theoretical studies independence is equated with non cooperation between the fiscal and monetary 
authorities in policy implementation. 
2 CBI brings about lower inflation without interfering with the process of growth (Cukierman, 1994). 
3 Between 1990 and 1995 at least thirty countries, spanning five continents, legislated increases in the statutory independence 
of their central banks (Maxfield, 1997). 
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CBs is easier as quantifying the legal charter is sufficient to reflect the degree of CBI. 
However, in developing countries this task is tremendously laborious as quantifying the legal 
charter often does not reflect the degree of independence of CBs. This is due to the fact that in 
developing countries the legal charter is often incomplete or ambiguous leaving a lot for 
subjective interpretation and even in the countries where the legal charter is clear enough, 
often the actual practice deviates from the law (Cukierman et al., 1992). As a result, 
quantifying other indicators that reflect actual practice is required to capture any divergences 
between legal and actual practices. 
 
As a developing country, Egypt has only two studies attempting to quantify its degree of CBI. 
The first study by Cukierman et al. (1992) is a cross-country analysis, which includes Egypt in 
the sample. This study evaluates the degree of independence of the CBE from a legal and 
behavioural context for the period (1950-1989). The more recent study is a country analysis by 
Ewiss (2003), which focused on measuring the degree of CBI in Egypt before and after the 
amendment
4 of the CB charter. However, Ewiss’s study did not include behavioural indices.   
 
This study extends these two previous studies by quantifying the degree of independence in the 
central bank of Egypt (CBE), from both a legal and behavioural context, since its establishment 
in 1961 until 2003 using four indices in line with the work of Jacome (2001), Cukierman, et al. 
(1992), and Cukierman and Webb (1995). Also, this study captures some aspects of 
discrepancy between the degree of independence conferred to the CBE by law and actual 
practice. In addition, the fact that within each index there are several indicators: legal, political, 
and economic helps to pinpoint which indicator requires more attention to reinforce the CBE 
independence, and what monetary policy stance can reinforce CBE independence. 
 
The basic research questions of this study can be summarized as follows: What is the 
independence status of the CBE from a legal point of view and what is the effect of the several 
amendments in the charter of the CBE on its degree of independence? Does the CBE enjoy 
independence in practice that is in line with its legal context (law 120, 1975 amended by law 
88, 2003), or is it just “nominal independence” lacking the required enforcement? And finally, 
if the legal and actual practice of CBI in Egypt diverges, what measures can be taken to 
reinforce the independence of the CBE?  
 
This study section is organized as follows. The second section presents a brief review of the 
empirical literature. Section three introduces the methodology for assessing the degree of CBI 
using four indices: the legal index, the rate of turnover of central bank governors index, the 
questionnaire based independence index, and the political vulnerability of central bank 
governors index. Section four analyzes the empirical results and presents some 







                                                 
4CB charter amended by Law 88 for year 2003.   3
II. Literature Review  
 
The desire to apply statistical tests to investigate the relation between CBI and inflation, 
and other macroeconomic variables prompted many studies since the 1980s to develop 
indices of CBI to capture the degree of independence using a single numerical value. 
However, due to the difficulty in quantifying the features of the CB (such as actual 
independence versus formal, and informal arrangements between the CB and the 
government) most of the studies that attempt to rank independence of the CB are based 
mostly on legal independence i.e. quantifying the legal charter of the CB and are mostly 
applied on industrial countries. There is a vast body of literature concerning the CBI and 
the relation between its independence and other macroeconomic indicators; however, this 
literature review only concentrates on the studies that attempt to develop indices and 
measure the degree of CBI.  
 
Bade and Parkin (1982) design the first quantitative index for legal independence of the 
CB. They construct a 4 scale
5 index of CBI for 12 industrial countries based on the 
“political independence” which is defined as the ability of the CB to select its policy 
objectives without influence from the government. There are three indicators that 
measure political independence. The first indicator reflects the relationship between the 
CB and the government in formulating and executing the monetary policy. The second 
indicator is concerned with the role of the government officials on the CB board of 
directors. Finally, the third indicator captures the ability of the CB to independently 
appoint some of the members on the board of directors. According to those three 
indicators there are four patterns of CB political independence (illustrated in Table 1). In 
their empirical study Bade and Parkin conclude that a CB that does not possess the 
authority of managing monetary policy cannot independently appoint the members of its 
board of directors. Also, they find that if a CB possesses authority of executing monetary 
policy independently from the government, this implicitly indicates that there are no 
government officials on the board of directors of the CB. 
 
Alesina (1988) has attempted to expand Bade and Parkin’s index by adding a fourth 
indicator to the three indicators above. This fourth indicator was the extent to which the 
CB is compelled to buy the Treasury bill surplus- a means by which the CB provides 
credit to the government (Refer to table to for a summary on Alesina’s results indirectly).  
 
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) introduce a more comprehensive index for CBI 
including more variables reflecting the extent of CBI. They applied this index on 18 
developed countries for the period 1950-1989 to measure the relation between CBI and 
inflation. They have designed a measure of CBI that included 15 variables reflecting both 
political independence and economic independence. “Political independence” is defined 
essentially, as previously mentioned in Bade and Parkin (1982). This measure is based on 
factors such as: whether or not the governor and the board of the CB are appointed by the 
government, whether government representatives sit on the board of the bank, whether 
government approval for monetary policy decisions is required, and whether the price 
stability objective is explicitly and prominently part of the central bank statute. 
                                                 
5 Where 1 refers to least independent and 4 indicates most independent.   4
“Economic independence” is defined as the ability to use instruments of monetary policy 
without restrictions. The most common constraint imposed on the conduct of monetary 
policy is the extent to which the CB is required to finance the government deficit. This 
index of economic independence essentially measures how easy it is for the government 
to finance its deficit by direct access to credit from the CB.  
 
Eijffinger and Schaling (1992) introduce a new measure for CBI. This index is an 
extension for the measure of Bade and Parkin (1982), and Grilli et al. (1991) index, 
where political independence is determined by the same three indicators identified in the 
previous two studies. Also, the patterns of political independence stated by Eijffinger and 
Schaling are no different from those stated by Bade and Parkin. Their only contribution is 
the introduction of a fifth pattern (the third pattern in Table 2) that takes into 
consideration the "Twin-Authority" case where the authority of formulating the monetary 
policy is distributed between the CB and the government. Eijffinger and Schaling reached 
two important conclusions; the first, is that "Twin-Authority" can not coincide in practice 
with the existence of government officials on the board of directors of the CB. Second, 
no CB facing "Twin-Authority" in practice can appoint the members of its board of 
directors independently from the political authority. 
 
The legal independence index developed by Cukierman et al. (1992) reflects the degree 
of independence that the legislator meant to confer to the CB, where coding legal 
independence depends only on the information written in the CB charter and only on 
precise legal characteristics. They observe that with the exception of three developed 
countries and two developing country, the study indicates that both country groups 
(developed and less developed) have very similar distributions of aggregate legal 
independence. 
 
All of the previously mentioned indices are only based on the law as they represent an 
interpretation of the legal charter of central banks. However, as previously mentioned, the 
legal status of a CB is one of several elements that determine its actual independence. 
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti note that indicators based only on the law have two 
problems. First, the laws are incomplete in that they cannot specify explicitly the limits of 
authority between the CB and the political authorities under all contingencies. These 
voids are filled by tradition at best and by power politics at worst. Second, even when the 
law is quite explicit, actual practice may deviate from it. As a result of this defect in legal 
indices, the need for indices that capture actual independence was inevitable.  
 
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) introduce a valuable study on measuring CBI and 
its relation to inflation. This study goes beyond the previous work in including a wide 
sample of countries, including up to 72 countries (21 industrial countries and 51 
developing countries), and a wide time span from 1950-1989. But more importantly it 
introduced a methodology that captures not only the law but the spirit of the law by 
introducing two indices of actual independence (illustrated later), the turnover of central 
bank governor index and a questionnaire based index. Actual, as opposed to formal, CBI 
depends not only on the law, but also on many other less structured factors, such as 
informal arrangements between the CB and other parts of the government, the quality of   5
the CB’s research department, and the personality of key individuals in the CB and the 
government. Because of the difficulty in quantifying such features in an impartial 
manner, previous studies developed indices of CBI based mostly on legal independence 
and only for the industrial countries. Hence, this index is superior relative to previous 
indices as it is not only more comprehensive but it also captures different aspects of 
independence. 
     
As mentioned above, the study of Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) provided two 
indices that capture actual independence. The first is the Turnover of Central Bank 
Governor Index. This indicator is based on the presumption that more rapid turnover of 
CB governor's indicates a lower level of independence. This presumption is based on the 
idea that if the political authorities frequently take the opportunity to choose a new 
governor, they will have the opportunity to pick those who will carry their will. For high 
turnover rate, the period that the CB governor is in office is shorter than that of the 
executive branch, which does not enable him to engage in any long-term policies. 
However, they noted that it must be taken into account that a low turnover does not 
necessarily imply a high level of CBI, because a relatively subservient governor may stay 
in office for a long period of time. In their study they concluded that first, turnover rates 
in developing countries extend into a range considerably above the highest rates in the 
industrial countries; second, there is no distinct variation in the average turnover rates 
among industrial countries within the sample period.  
 
The second actual indicator that they have designed is the questionnaire based index of 
CBI. This indicator of CBI is based on responses to a questionnaire that was sent to a 
sample of monetary policy specialists. The questions involve the same issues underlying 
legal variables, but they focus on the practice rather than the law. Also, the questionnaire 
referred to additional issues such as the determination of the bank budget, the strictness 
of limitations on lending in practice and the degree of actual tenure overlap between the 
governor and high executive officials in the executive branch. The survey results indicate 
that central banks in developing countries are less independent than those in industrial 
countries, where only two industrial countries are below the median of the sample, and 
only four developing countries are above it. This finding contrasts with the legal 
independence indicator, where the two country groups do not differ widely, but is similar 
to the finding of the turnover indicator. Although, the responses to this questionnaire are 
based on subjective evaluations so this index probably contains more noise than the legal 
index of CBI, still it is a better reflection of actual CBI. 
  
Cukierman and Webb (1995) introduce the political vulnerability of the CB governors 
index, which is considered a development to the rate of turnover index. Where the latter 
index just measures the tenure of the CB governor, however, the former measures  the 
extent to which a change in the CB governor is related to a change in the executive 
authority. Cukierman and Webb (1995) define political vulnerability of CB governors as 
the ratio of political change followed within 6 months by a change in the central bank 
governor. According to this concept, political vulnerability is an indicator of the political 
influence on the CB. Using a sample of 67 countries (20 developed and 47 developing) 
between 1950 and 1989, Cukierman and Webb find that the number of times that the CB   6
governor changes during "political periods", defined as a period witnessing a change in 
the CB governor during six months from a change in executive authority and as a direct 
consequence of that change. This is more than double the turnover during "non-political 
periods”. This gives a strong implication that the political influence on the CB has been 
the rule rather than the exception till the end of the 1980s. However, there are substantial 
differences among country groups. The within six months vulnerability is three times 
higher in developing countries than in developed countries. There are also substantial 
differences in vulnerability according to the regime type within developing countries. 
Average vulnerability is highest in “mixed regime” countries that alternate between 
democratic and authoritarian regimes, and lowest in developing countries with always 
authoritarian regimes. It assumes an intermediate value in developing countries that had a 
democratic regime throughout the entire sample period. This index has the advantage that 
it takes into account actual practice of independence rather than the legislated one. Also, 
its advantage over the turnover index is that it provides a clearer picture about the relation 
between the executive authorities and the CB. However, it shares with the turnover index 
the disadvantage of being a noisy index as it is potentially subject to reverse causality 
from economic variables. 
 
Most of the indices measuring CBI neglected indicators concerning the accountability, 
the extent of transparency of the CB, and the CB’s role as lender of last resort (LOLR) 
for the financial sector. The study that follow, represent an attempt to rectify this 
deficiency. 
   
Briault et al. (1996) survey 14 OECD countries using their accountability index which 
focuses on monetary policy. The index uses four criteria: (i) external monitoring of the 
CB by the parliament; (ii) publication of minutes of policy meetings; (iii) publication of 
reports on inflation and monetary policy in addition to standard CB bulletins; and (iv) 
explicit or implicit procedures in case the government overrules the CB. They find that 
there appears to exist some trade-off between a large degree of CB autonomy (goal 
independence) and their index for accountability. 
 
Lybek (1999) develops an index for CB legal independence and the CB accountability
6. 
He applied this index in 15 countries in the Baltic States, Russia, and other countries of 
the former Soviet Union in the period 1995 -1997, to identify the relation between the CB 
autonomy, and inflation and output performance. Lybek index was designed to include all 
aspects of legal independence for the CB determined by the IMF, so this index is also 
called the IMF-modified index. He designed 21 variables
7 (economic policy objective, 
financial system and the supervisory role of the CB, monetary policy, foreign exchange 
policy, policy coordination, conflict resolution, appointment of governor, dismissal of 
governor, government representation in the board, limits on lending, interest rates, 
securitization, quasi-fiscal activities, monetary instruments, solvency, publication of 
statements, audits) to reflect the extent of CB legal independence and accountability. 
These variables are similar to those introduced by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman et 
                                                 
6 Accountability depends on the obligation of the CB governor to appear before the congress and the government, and 
the disclosure of CB publications on a timely basis (Lybek , 1999). 
7 For further detail on these variables refer to Lybek (1999).   7
al. (1992), but they are more detailed and comprehensive, as they include transparency 
aspects. Also, Lybek was very precise when converting the legal articles to numerical 
values
8 (his numerical evaluation consist of whole numbers and fractions) which makes 
his index very accurate in comparison to the previous indices.  
 
Jacome (2001) designs a CB legal independence and accountability index. He 
implemented his study on 14 countries in Latin America during the 1990s. Jacome's 
index is by far the most comprehensive index, where it includes political and economic 
variables determined by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992) but with some 
adjustments. This index includes variables of CB financial independence determined by 
IMF-modified index, and variables concerning the CB as a lender of last resort which is 
considered the main contribution of Jacome. However, Jacome's index failed to capture 
the aspect concerning the supervisory role of the CB on other banks.  
 
Ewiss (2003) provides the first study that measures the degree of CBI in Egypt for the 
period 1950-2003. He investigates the recent amendment in the charter of the CB 
according to law 88 year 2003 using Cukierman et al. (1992) and Jacome (2001) legal 
indices. Ewiss also examines some monetary and fiscal indicators over the period 1951-
2002 as an indicator of the extent of independence of the monetary policy from executive 
authorities. He also presents the cases of CB independence in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and Argentina. He concludes that the amendment of 
the CB charter lead to only slight increase in CBE independence, still the degree of CBE 
remains low. Also, the fiscal and monetary indicators show that the CBE has been 




A-Sample and Methodology 
 
For the quantitative analysis of CBI in Egypt, this study uses 44 years of data
9 from 
1961
10 to 2004. The period covered in this study is divided into four decades, where the 
Egyptian economy passed through four main developments
11, namely, the nationalisation 
and heavy state intervention of the 1960s; the infitah (open door policy) adopted during 
the 1970s; the first attempt for economic reform during the 1980s; and the initiation of a 
comprehensive Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) in the 
early 1990s. The four sub-periods are divided as follows: 1961-1971, 1972-1982, 1983-
1993, and 1994-2004. 
 
                                                 
8 For example, the numerical evaluation of term in office variable ranges from ¼ to 1 as follows: if the term exceeds 5 
years it is assigned the numerical value of 1; if the term in office is exactly 5 years it is assigned ¾; if the term can 
exceed 4years it gets a numerical value of 1/2; finally, if the term is 4 years it is assigned ¼. 
9 The data source is (El Tashriat El Mesriah, and the CBE). This study is a quantitative comparison through 
the years. 
10 In year 1960, law no.250 (amended by law no.277 in the same year) was promulgated providing for the 
establishment of the CBE (which was established in 1961). 
11 This follows the division introduced by Mohieldin and Kouchouk (2002).   8
This study applies four measures of CBI where each measure will be studied and applied 
independently over time. The first measure applied is the legal index drawn from the 
study by Jacome (2001). Three indicators of actual (behavioural) independence are then 
introduced: the rate of turnover of CB governors index drawn from the paper by 
Cukierman, et al. (1992), an index based on a questionnaire answered by monetary 
specialists in line with the questionnaire introduced in Cukierman, et al. (1992), and the 
last index is based on the political vulnerability of CB governors index drawn from the 
paper by Cukierman and Webb (1995). Each indicator is designed in such a way that it 
captures a somewhat different aspect of independence. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the study by Ewiss (2003) introduced two legal indices for 
measuring CBI in Egypt, one in line with Cukierman et al. (1992) and the other is drawn 
from Jacome (2001), where he opted to measure the influence of the amendment of the 
CB law (Law88/year 2003) on the legal independence of the CBE, by dividing his sample 
(1951-2003) to two sub-periods, before and after the 2003 amendment. However, his 
study did not include any behavioural independence index. He sufficed by examining 
some fiscal and monetary indicators to reflect the degree of actual CBI in Egypt. 
 
This study introduces both legal and behavioural indicators of independence because in a 
typical developing country such as Egypt, the legal index is not sufficient because even 
when the law (or charter of the CB) is quite explicit, actual practice frequently deviates 
from the law. Therefore, for Egypt as well as most developing countries, the three other 
indicators of actual independence are essential to capture the gap between actual practice 




1. The Legal Index 
 
Legal independence is an essential component of CBI because it reflects the degree of 
independence that the legislator meant to confer to the CB (Cukierman et al. 1992). The 
criteria used to evaluate legal independence depend only on the relatively precise legal 
information written in the CB charter that is of relevance to the issue of CBI. 
Nevertheless, the task of attempting to quantify the legal aspect of CBI remains difficult 
and inevitably requires some degree of subjectivity, especially that many provisions in 
the CB charters are not directly related to the issue of independence. Jacome’s index is 
used in this study to quantify the legal independence of the CBE as explained briefly in 
the following section. 
 
A. A Brief Description of Jacome’s index 
 
Jacome’s index represents an extension to traditional indices (Grilli et al., 1991 and 
Cukierman et al., 1992) as this index incorporates most of the political and economic 
criteria used in the former indices. In addition, this index incorporates criteria of financial 
autonomy, accountability, and transparency. Also, Jacome’s index incorporates the   9
design LOLR mechanisms which are typically not included in previous indices. This 
results in Jacome’s ten criteria index
12 (illustrated in Table 3). The first criterion refers to 
the objective legally assigned to the CB; criteria 2 to 4 are related to the political 
autonomy of the CB; criteria 5 to 7 refer to its economic autonomy; criterion 8 relates to 
the CB’s financial autonomy; whereas criteria 9 and 10 are linked to the accountability 
and transparency of the CB policies and procedures. The possible values assigned to each 
of the ten criteria are 0, 0.5, or 1 depending on how the legal provisions related to such 
criteria are conducive to CBI. Moreover, in comparison to previous indices Jacome’s 
index conforms to the best practice guidelines for CBI and accountability (presented in 
the next section) which are considered the main components of CB reform. 
 
A differentiated weight (1, 2, and 3) for the individual criteria is another particular 
characteristic of this index. This implies that some of the criteria included in the index are 
believed to be more important than others in terms of their contribution to CBI. Thus, the 
autonomy to design and conduct monetary policy, and the prohibition to finance the fiscal 
deficit are assigned the highest weight 3, since they are assumed to be the key factors 
contributing to the independence of monetary policy and to the reduction of inflation. The 
objective assigned to the CB, the institutional procedures for the appointment, term of 
office, and the dismissal of members of the CB board of directors, as well as the design 
of the LOLR provisions are assigned a weight of 2. Finally, the criteria related to 
financial autonomy, accountability, and the transparency are assigned a weight of 1. The 
maximum possible score for the CBI according to this index is 19. Since this study is a 
quantitative comparison through the years, this index is applied to the four, previously 












                                                 
12 As in similar studies, the structure, values, and weights of Jacome Index, are discretional and thereby subject to 
debate.   10
B. Description of the numerical evaluation of the disaggregated legal variables 
 
As mentioned earlier the numerical evaluation or scoring the CBE provisions (0,0.5,1) is 
based on the extent to which these provisions contribute to CBI and accountability, and 
conform to the best practice guidelines for CBI, that represent the basis  to the CB 
reform. The exact CBE legislation that is scored is mentioned in Annex 1, the numerical 
evaluation of the disaggregated legal variables is found in Table 4, and Table 5 provides 
the exact calculations and weights of each criterion during the four sub-periods of the 
study. 
 
The first criterion described by the index used in this study is the objective legally 
assigned to the CBE. According to the CBE’s provisions almost during the first three 
sub-periods of the study the CBE was always assigned multiple objectives and sometimes 
even conflicting. So during the first three decades this criterion is assigned the value 0.5. 
However, in the last period
13, the Law 2003 amendment established that preserving price 
stability is the main objective of the CB, which is considered an improvement (and a step 
in advance in the institutional reform of the CBE), so for the last sub-period this criterion 
is assigned the value 1. 
 
In terms of political autonomy of the CBE described by criteria 2-4, the second criterion, 
concerning  the appointment of the CB board members and their term in office,  is 
assigned the value zero in  the four sub-periods of the study to penalize the government 
behaviour which dominates the appointment process. Also, the tenure of CBE governors 
stated in the CB charter is 4 (renewable) years. As a result, their term in office is even 
shorter than the election cycle of the main exclusive body (the President) in the 
appointment process. This is also penalized by assigning the value 0 to this second 
criterion. The third criterion relates to the structure of the CBE board is assigned the 
value 0.5 in the first, second and last sub-periods where the CBE laws allow for direct 
government representatives on the board, but it did not specify the inclusion of any 
private sector representatives. However, in the third sub-period, the value assigned to this 
criterion is decreased to zero to penalize the provision specified by law 1984 which 
allowed private sector representatives on the board.  
 
The fourth criterion, namely the removal of board members
14, is assigned the value 0 in 
the first sub-period where the CB charter contained no article on such matter. 
Nevertheless, this value is increased to 1 in the second and third sub-periods to reflect 
that Law 1975 concerning the CBE which explicitly stated that the governor cannot be 
dismissed during his term in office. However, in the last sub-period this value dropped 
again to 0 where Law 2003 neglected mentioning of any regulations concerning the 
dismissal of the CB governor or any of the board members which is considered a major 
drawback of this legislation. 
                                                 
13 During each period, if there are two consecutive legal amendments the researchers opt at numerically evaluating 
(ranking) the more recent amendment, this leads to relatively the same results as taking the weighted average of the 
numerical value that is obtained from each of the two laws, due to the fact that any changes in the CB legislations is 
relatively minor and slow. 
14 In this study evaluating this criterion only included the governor’s dismissal where the CBE laws do not state any 
article concerning the dismissal of CB board members.   11
 
As to the economic autonomy of the CBE which is represented in this index by criteria 5 
to 7; concerning the fifth criterion covering the CBE granting credit to the government 
(or in other words the prohibition to finance the fiscal deficit), all the CBE legislations 
relevant to the four criterion concerned with CBE credit for the government throughout 
the four decades of the study, stipulate that the CBE provides direct credit to the 
government with limits. Accordingly, this criterion is assigned the value 0.5 throughout 
the study period. This behaviour is not penalized by assigning the value 0 because the CB 
does not grant credit to the government in discretion.  Still it is not rewarded by the value 
1 since the CBE provisions do not stipulate clearly under what circumstances the CB 
provides credit to the government.    
    
The sixth criterion relates to the LOLR provisions which did not change throughout the 
four sub-periods allowing the CBE to grant the government emergency loans legally 
regulated, without limits. This LOLR mechanism is partially penalized by assigning the 
value 0.5, as although the LOLR is not discretionary, it does not condition the amount to 
be granted. 
 
Concerning the seventh criterion, namely the CB’s independence in the use of monetary 
instruments, during the 1960s the CB was not entirely free to set these rates; hence, this 
criterion is assigned the value 0 in this decade. During the 1970s and 1980s, the CB law
15 
has freed the CB from the limits on the use of the monetary policy instruments; still the 
same law did not state that the CBE is free to set monetary policy objectives and limited 
the CBE role to executing the monetary and credit policy according to state plans. In the 
final sub-period, Law 2003 altered the articles organizing this issue, but this alteration 
was controversial, even though it allowed the CBE to freely use instruments of monetary 
policy that enables it to set and execute monetary policy, the latter should happen in 
accordance with the government (through a committee of nine members who are mostly 
government officials) which undermines the CBI. Accordingly, this criterion is assigned 
the value 0.5 in the last three periods. 
 
 The eighth criterion in this index is concerned with the financial autonomy of the CBE 
which is assigned the value 1 throughout the four sub-periods as the CBE legislations 
always provided for the CB capital integrity.  
 
Finally, the last two criteria , accountability and transparency, each of which is given a 
value of 0.5 during the 1960s, where the CB had to report only to the government and to 
publish statements approved by a public sector auditor. However, in the last three sub-
periods introduction of Law 1975 and the laws thereafter stipulated provisions for the 
appearance of the CB governor before the people’s assembly, in addition to reporting to 
the government. Also, to ensure transparency the CB is required to publish its financial 
statements periodically which are certified by external auditors. These enhancements in 
the CBE provisions accounted for assigning the highest numerical rank 1 for the last two 
criteria in the last three sub-periods of the study. 
 
                                                 
15Law120/1975, for exact statement of the article refer to Annex I.   12
C. Aggregating the Legal variables and evaluating the amendments by Law 2003 
 
Although, the maximum possible score for CBI according to the index used in this study 
is 19, yet throughout the study period not in one single sub-period has the CBE degree of 
independence reached this maximum score (see Figure 1 and Table 5) or even reach the 
average of CBI in Latin American countries amounting to13 (Jacome, 2001). It can be 
noted that the consecutive CBE legislations did not radically improve the degree of 
independence of the CB; mainly because the amendments introduced by each legislation 
were minute. Even the most recent amendment to the CB legislations, Law 88 for year 
2003, which was considered as a step towards the institutional reform of CBE and an 
advocation to adopting the price stability objective as a priority to build up the CBEI, 
failed to enhance the degree of CBI in Egypt. In what follows, we discuss the index of 
legal independence in the context of a more general economic framework in each of the 
three studied periods.  
 
First period (1961-1971): This period corresponds to the decade of heavy state 
intervention in the Egyptian economy. During this period the CBE acted according to the 
law provisions as the bank of the state which diminished its independence and needless to 
mention its accountability. Hence, the CBE scored 6.5 which is the lowest degree of 
independence scored by CBE during the four periods of the study as illustrated in Figure 
1. The CBE legislations during this period needed pro-CBI amendment especially the 
articles concerning the dismissal of the CB board, the instrument independence of the 
CB, and the articles regulating the accountability, transparency and disclosure of 
financial statements. 
 
Second period (1972-1982): In this period the Egyptian economy witnessed the adoption 
of the open door policy and embarked on a number of institutional reforms. One of those 
reforms was the introduction of Law 120 year 1975 concerning the CBE and the banking 
system which is considered as the best written law for the CBE so far as it gave the CBE 
large autonomy and stipulated greater accountability. This can be perceived by observing 
the enhancement in the different provisions of the CB law, e.g. the article that protects the 
CB’s governor tenure by stipulating that he can not be dismissed during his term in office 
or his renewal; the article granting the CB greater instrument independence in the 
conduct of monetary policy; and the articles providing for greater CB accountability and 
transparency. Thanks to this law, the CBE scored its highest degree of independence and 
accountability throughout the four periods of the study amounting to 11.    
 
The third period (1983-1993): Although, during this period Law 50 for year 1984 was 
introduced, yet it did not introduce many amendments to Law 1975. The only major 
change in the CB charter introduced by Law 1980 was the article concerning the structure 
of the CB board including (executive) private sector members. However, this change 
resulted in diminishing the degree of CBEI to 10 during this period compared to 11 in the 
previous period. 
 
Fourth period (1994-2004): In the beginning of this period, the presidential decree for 
year 1993 concerning the CBE and the banking system was in effect. However, a more   13
recent and altering amendment was introduced towards the end of the decade, namely 
Law 88 for year 2003. This latter law is considered controversial because on one hand it 
introduced some amendments (discussed later in detail) to the CB charter that enhanced 
the degree of CBEI; on the other hand, it added (or removed) some others that negatively 
affected the CBI.  This might explain why the degree of CBEI amounted to 10 after the 
introduction of 2003 amendments.  This is the same degree of independence as the 
preceding period even though the 2003 amendment was introduced.
16   
     
The amendment to the CBE charter by Law 2003 is considered controversial owing to the 
following reasons: 
First, even though, Law 2003 stipulated that the structure of the CB board does not 
include any private sector member yet, heavy government existence is still dominating 
the board, this is evident through the provisions for the appointment and structure of the 
CB board. In addition, this Law offered no improvement to the term of office of the 
governor or the CB board members. Second, Law 2003 does not stipulate any article 
prohibiting the dismissal of the CB board members including the governor during their 
term in office which is a deterioration in the CB political autonomy in contrast to Law 
1975 (see Annex I, B4). Third, this law provided no articles stipulating improvements to 
the economic autonomy of the CBE, such as articles imposing stricter conditions on the 
CB’s granting credit to the government, or the CB LOLR mechanism. Finally, one 
controversial issue that Law 2003 introduced is the article providing the CBE more 
independence by allowing the CB to both set and execute monetary policy and to freely 
use monetary policy instruments. However, an article in that same Law stipulates that 
CBE sets the goals of the monetary policy in accordance with the executive authority 
through a committee (of nine members mainly government officials), which reveals again 
the government involvement that undermines the CBE’s autonomy.  
 
From the above discussion, one can argue that, the objective of the CBE stated by Law 
2003 can be considered as a major step in the institutional reform of the CBE. However, 
the CBE legislations still have to undergo major improvements to ensure the political 
autonomy of the CBE and its freedom from heavy government involvement. Also, the 
CBE enjoys a medium economic autonomy, which Law 2003, attempted to enhance by 
allowing the CB to both set and execute monetary policy and to freely use monetary 
policy instruments. Nevertheless, the heavy government intervention (stipulated by the 
law!) embodied in the CB structure, and its decision making process has hindered this 
attempt for institutional reform. This institutional weakness tends to create uncertainty 
over the long-term goals of monetary policy and may allow for “inflationary bias” 
(Jacome, 2001).  
  
Despite the fact that this index offers a simple way of aggregating the complex structure 
of the CB into one numerical value by introducing simple weights and values for each 
criterion, still, this index has some drawbacks. First, it does not include the supervisory 
role of the CB. Second, as in similar studies, it is based on subjective evaluation. Finally, 
similar to all legal indices Jacome’s index reflects only de-jure (legal) CBEI and does not 
                                                 
16 This result does not differ much from Ewiss (2003) who used Jacome’s to estimate the CBE degree of 
independence.  Similarly, he calculated that CBE degree of independence at 9 and 9.5 after the amendment.   14
convey the CBI in practice which may deviate from that which is conferred by the 
legislator. Consequently, actual indices will be introduced to try to capture any 
discrepancy between the degree of CBEI granted by the law and that enjoyed in practice.     
2. Turnover of Central Bank Governor Index 
As explained in the literature review section, this indicator is based on the presumption 
that more rapid turnover of CB governor's indicates a lower level of CBI (Cukierman et 
al., 1992). In most countries, the electoral cycle is at least 4 years; hence, for an average 
tenure of four to five years, the threshold turnover, above which independence declines 
seriously is somewhere between 0.25 and 0.2 changes a year according to Cukierman 
(1992), and Cukierman et al. (1992). 
 
Table 6 and figure 2 depict the trend of the turnover index
17 over the four sub-periods. 
Looking at the table and figure, one can observe the following: 
 
First period (1961-1971): The turnover of CB governors index is 0.27 during this period, 
indicating the relative stability of this period. The average turnover of CB governors does 
not exceed the threshold of 0.2 and 0.25 except during the tenure of Mr. Zendo (1964-
1967), where his calculated turnover rate turned to be 0.33. However, it should be noted 
that the CBE Law 1960 stated that the governor tenure is 3 years; thus Zendo’s term in 
office can not be considered short according to the law.  
 
Second period (1972-1982): This period can be regarded as the most stable period, where 
the average turnover rate of CB governors is 0.18. This stability in the turnover of CB 
governors coincides with Law 1975 which is considered by many experts as the best 
written charter for the CBE confirming the results obtained earlier under the legal index. 
 
Third period (1983-1993):  The average turnover rate assigned to this period is 0.27, 
marking a relatively high turnover in CB governors. This period demonstrates a deviation 
between actual practice and the law as the first half of this period witnessed a very high 
turnover for two governors, namely Mr. Shalaby (1982-1985) and Mr. Negm (1985-
1986), which is 0.33 and 1 respectively; although the CB charter for this period states that 
the CB governor tenure is 4 renewable years (which should secure an average turnover 
rate of at most 0.25). 
 
Final period (1994-2003): The most remarkable feature of this period is that it witnessed 
two extremes. On one hand, the first governor during this period, Mr. Hassan (1993-
2001), has the lowest turnover rate (0.125) throughout the four periods under study. On 
the other hand, the following governor, Dr. Abou El Eyoun (2001-2003), is assigned one 
of the highest turnover rates, an average turnover of 0.5, which probably indicates that he 
was pressured to resign before his term expired. This resulted in increasing the average 
turnover rate of this decade to reach 0.2. It should be noted that the average turnover rate 
                                                 
17  Two methods were used to calculate this index. However, both methods have yielded similar resuls as 
explained in Annex II. The first method assumes that the average turnover rate is equal to the average 
number of changes in CB governers per year. The second method is a weighted average turnover of each 
governor.   15
of the last (and current) governor, Mr. El Oukda, is not calculated as it remains unknown 
for how long he will stay in office. 
 
Overall, it can be noted that the actual tenure of CBE governors does not deviate 
significantly from that stipulated by the law throughout the four sub periods. Even in the 
first and third periods, where the average turnover rate exceeds the threshold rate 
(determined by Cukierman et. al., 1992) beyond which the level of independence of the 
CB is said to decline, the magnitude of deviation is very minute and can not be 
considered significant enough to negatively affect the degree of CBE independence. 
Nonetheless, the turnover index indicates that three governors, Mr. Shalaby and Mr. 
Negm, during the third period and Dr. Abou el Eyoun during the final period did not 
complete their term in office. To further investigate the relation between political 
influence executed by the government and CB governor’s term in office the following 
index, the political vulnerability index, is introduced. 
3. Political Vulnerability of Central Bank Governors Index 
This index is an actual degree of independence indicator. It was introduced by Cukierman 
and Webb (1995), who define political vulnerability of CB governors as the ratio of 
political change followed within 6 months
18 by a change in the CB governor. Hence, this 
index measures the basic idea of this index is based on measuring the extent to which a 
change in the CB governor is related to a change in the executive authority.  According to 
this concept, political vulnerability is an indicator of the political influence on the CB. 
The higher this ratio the higher is the political influence executed by the government on 
the CB and vice versa. Political vulnerability index might be considered as a development 
to the turnover of CB governors index. The difference between the two indices is whereas 
the turnover index takes into account all the cases of change in the CB governor, the 
political vulnerability index takes only those cases that directly follow a change in 
executive authority. 
 
Table 7 represents the result of applying this index on the CBE assuming that a change in 
the Egyptian Prime Minister represents a change in the executive authority, although 
according to the Egyptian constitution the President is the head of the executive authority. 
This can be justified by the fact that the Egyptian presidents tend to stay in office for 
excessively long periods of time (an average tenure of about 13 years). Thus a change in 
the Prime Minister is a more dynamic indicator of a change in the executive authority. 
 
The first period (1961-1971) witnessed one case of political vulnerability, where the 
appointment of the CB governor Mr. Nazmy in February 1967 followed a political 
change, namely the appointment of Muhamed Sedki Sulayman as Egypt’s Prime Minister 
in September 1966, after nearly 5 months. This political vulnerability can be confirmed 
by checking the turnover index and noting that Mr.Zendo (1964-1967), the CB governor 
preceding Mr.Nazmy, stayed in office for 3 years but his term in office was not renewed, 
unlike the tenure of the governors preceding and following him whose terms in office 
were renewed for one year. Thus, the political vulnerability ratio assigned to this period is 
                                                 
18 According to Cukierman and Webb statistical tests reveal that the appropriate cut-off between “political periods” and 
“non political periods is six months.   16
1/6 because during this period there were 6 changes in the Egyptian Prime Ministers and 
only one CB governor changed within 6 months of those ministerial changes. 
 
Again, during the second period (1972-1982) there was only one case of political 
vulnerability. That is the appointment of the governor Zendo for the second time in 
February 1971, subsequent to a political change which is the appointment of Prime 
Minister Mahmoud Fawzy in October 1970. Also, the turnover index verifies this   
political vulnerability case as the governor preceding Mr. Zendo’s second time in office: 
Mr. Nazmy (Feb 1967-Feb 1971) completed only one year of his 3 renewable years in 
office. It is worth mentioning that this second period witnessed radical political change as 
it marked the end of Nasser’s era (Egypt’s second president) and the start of Sadat’s era. 
Hence, the political vulnerability ratio assigned to this period is also 1/6 because out of 6 
changes in the Egyptian Prime Ministers only Mr. Nazmy was changed within 6 months 
of the change in executive authorities. 
 
The third period of the study (1983-1993) witnessed two cases of political vulnerability. 
The first case is the appointment of Mr. Shalaby, the CBE governor in February 1982 
following the appointment of Prime Minister, Ahmed Fuad Mohieddin in February 1982. 
However, the turnover index does not confirm this as a case of political vulnerability 
because the governor prior to Mr. Shalaby, Mr. Ibrahim (1976-1982), completed his term 
in office with 4 renewable years. The second case is the appointment of Dr. Hamed in 
November1986 right after the appointment of a new Prime Minister for Egypt, Mr. Atef 
Sedki in November 1986. This case of political vulnerability is confirmed by observing 
the short tenure of Mr. Negm (1985-1986), the governor that preceded Dr.Hamed, who 
barely exceeded one year. Consequently, the political vulnerability ratio in this period is 
2/4 because of 4 changes in the Egyptian Prime Ministers only two of these changes were 
directly followed by a change in the CB governors.  
 
Final period (1994-2004): The political vulnerability ratio assigned to this period is 0 
because no change in the CBE governors followed the 4 changes in the Egyptian Prime 
Ministers within six months, still there exists some evidence that the CBE governor Dr. 
Abou El Eyoun (2001-2003) was forced by the political authorities to resign. This is 
confirmed by the turnover index as mentioned earlier, as he did not complete his term in 
office. 
 
To sum up, one can argue that the third period witnessed the highest political 
vulnerability ratio which points to the high political influence executed by the 
government on the CB independence during the period of analysis. Also, it is worth 
mentioning that both the turnover index and the political vulnerability index should be 
studied side by side as they complement each other. This is confirmed by the observation 
during the last period where the political vulnerability index specifies that this period is a 
non-political period; however the turnover index draws the attention that this might not 
be the case.   17
4. Questionnaire Based Independence Index 
This last index is based on responses to a questionnaire
19 presented in Annex 3. This 
questionnaire focuses on the CBI in practice rather than the theoretical independence 
stipulated by the law. The questionnaire was filled out by a number of economists and 
monetary specialists (see figure 3 for the distribution of respondents), whose responses 
were analyzed based on a group of indicators each assigned a code and a weight asshown 
in table 8 (Cukierman et al. (1992)). The possible numerical values of the codes are 0, 
0.5, and 1, where 0 reflects the answer that conveys least the CBI and 1 reflects the 
highest CBI. If the question has four possible choices then the codes can take the 
numerical values of 0, 0.33, 0.66 and 1, where 0.33 reflects an answer that conveys 
moderately low CBI, and 0.66 conveys moderately high CBI. The weight
20  of each 
question is set according to Cukierman et al. (1992). The questionnaire is applied to the 
two most recent sub-periods (1983-1993 and 1994-2004). It is designed to reflect the 
seven issues listed below. 
 
 The first issue is the extent to which the term of office of the governor and board of 
directors is independent from the government. If the turnover of the CB governor 
coincides with the turnover of the government indicating high political vulnerability, then 
the CB is likely to be less independent and vice versa. The second issue is related to 
actual limitations on CB lending to the government. The third issue examines the extent 
to which the conflict between the CB and the government is resolved in favour of the 
latter. The fourth issue considers two aspects of financial independence of the CB, 
whether the CB has the authority to determine its budget, and set the salaries of its 
officials. The fifth issue is composed of two items concerning the intermediate policy 
targets. The first item assesses the quantitative monetary targets and the second item 
deals with interest rate targets. Actual priority of the objective price stability is the sixth 
issue investigated. Lastly, the final issue considers the extent to which the CB provides 
subsidized credit to encourage development. 
 
Responses to the questionnaire were analyzed using 2 methods
21 which yielded similar 
results. Looking at table 9 one can make the following observations: 
 
For the first issue, “responses indicate that that there has been relatively little overlap 
between the tenure of the governor” and the government. This indicates that the CBE 
governor is likely to be independent and not subservient to the government. Hence, this 
first issue scored the highest code of 1 in both periods. 
 
Concerning the second issue, “the limitation on lending in practice”, responses indicate 
that these limits are moderately loose in both the first and second periods under study. 
Hence, this issue scored 0.33 in both periods. This result is coherent with what the Legal 
index earlier showed concerning the CBE lending to the government. 
                                                 
19 It is worth noting that the questionnaire is based on subjective evaluations so this index probably contains some 
noise; however, it also contains additional significant information about actual independence.  
20 Using equal weights gave equal ranking in Cukierman et al. (1992) sample so they resorted to this differentiated 
weight. 
21 The mode and the weighted average based on frequency of responses, but the score according to the mode is reported 
here as the weighted average score will approximate to the value of the mode.   18
 
As to the third issue which tackles “the resolution of conflicts between the CBE and the 
government”, there was almost consensus among questionnaire respondents that 
resolution of conflicts is in favour of the government in almost all of the cases. This is 
translated into a score of 0 in both periods under study. This issue is in agreement with 
the evidence from the legal index that the government dominates the CBE political 
authority. 
 
 As for the fourth issue, “the financial independence of the CBE”, which is calculated by 
taking the simple average of the numerical coding of two items: the first is whether the 
CB has the authority to determine its budget; and the second is setting the salaries of its 
officials. The first item scored the highest code of 1 in the two periods of the study which 
shows that the CBE is mostly free to determine its budget. The second item scored 0.5 
which conveys that the salaries of the CB officials are determined by a both the CB and 
the government in the two periods. 
 
The fifth issue dealing with “the existence of an intermediate policy target” is composed 
of two items: The first item measures the extent of CB adherence to a quantitative target; 
and the second is involved with the existence of a formal or informal interest rate target. 
Responses indicate that during the first period under study the CBE adhered moderately 
to a quantitative monetary target, indicating that the CBE can abandon this target to 
accommodate for more discretionary targets set by the government. Therefore, this item 
scored 0.66 in this period. However, the answers indicate that during the second period 
the CBE had strong adherence to its quantitative monetary target, so this item scored the 
highest code 1. The responses coincide with the fact that during the adoption ERSAP, the 
money supply was closely monitored in order to curb inflation. Concerning the CBE’s 
adoption of an interest rate target, the answers point out that the CBE adhered to an 
interest rate target during both the first and second periods. Hence, this item scored the 
lowest code 0 to reflect that a target for the nominal interest rate would typically work to 
limit the ability of the CB to respond to upsurges of inflation (Cukierman et al., 1992). 
However, it must be noted that formally under the ERSAP the interest rate was 
supposedly free and determined by supply and demand. This shows that responses reflect 
the fact that there has been deviation between what was announced and what was being 
practices concerning the interest rate policy. 
 
As to the sixth issue, “The actual priority of the CBE”, the responses indicate that 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate was the first priority of the CBE during the two periods 
of the study. Therefore, this item scored 0.66 during the first and second period indicating 
that although the CBE did not adopt multiple conflicting objectives but had a top priority, 
yet this priority was given to the exchange rate and not to the price stability. However, it 
must be noted that towards the end of the second period, specifically in 2003, two 
important developments took place: one is the floating of the exchange rate and two is the 
issuance of the CBE Law 2003 which stipulates that maintaining price stability is the 
primary objective of the CBE. Yet, it seems that these developments are too recent that 
the respondents to the questionnaire neglected these developments, or that the CB did not 
actually take actual steps towards achieving price stability.   19
 
The last issue, “the function of the CB as a development bank”, scored 0.66 in the first 
period to reflect the responses that the CBE granted, to some extent, credit at subsidized 
rates in the first period. However, in the second period, this issue scored the highest code 
1 as the responses indicate that the CBE no longer extends credit at subsidized rates, 
reflecting that it does not act as a development bank. 
 
In general, this actual index pinpoints three variables that need enhancement to increase 
the degree of CBEI: (i) lending to the government in practice; (ii) the link between the 
CB and the political authorities; (iii) and finally the interest rate policy. Summing up the 
weighted value of the seven issues (variables) in the first and second period indicate a 
slight increase in CBEI from 0.5 in the first period to 0.6 in the second period, where 0.6 
was the median of a group of 23 developed and developing countries calculated by 
Cukierman et al., 1992 and almost all developing countries fell below that median. This 





Assessing the different indices and comparing indicators of legal CBI with indicators of 
actual (behavioral) CBI pinpoints certain aspects that need enhancement to improve the 
stance of CBEI. In the light of these aspects the study introduces some recommendations 
for the improvement of the CBE legislations and presents the following monetary policy 
stance that would contribute to enhancing the CBEI: 
  
Examining the legal index of CBE through the period 1951-2004 reveals that even what 
is considered by many economists and legislators as the best written charter for the CBE, 
Law 1975 yielded only a moderate degree of independence. Furthermore, the latest 
amendment to the CBE charter Law 2003 proved controversial, because although some 
of its articles contribute positively to the institutional reform of the CBE, especially the 
one that sets the primary objective of the CB; yet, other articles are not written in a 
precise way, leaving much room for debate about their contribution to the independence 
of the CBE, especially the articles concerning the responsibility of the CB in setting and 
executing the monetary policy. In addition, no serious attempts were made to enhance CB 
political autonomy such as: introducing a major increase in the term of office of the 
governor. Also, no much enhancement to the structure of the CB board was stipulated 
such as to constrict the participation of government officials to participate on the board 
without a right to vote. Moreover, removing the article about prohibiting the dismissal of 
the CB governor during his term in office is considered a step back toward CBI. Hence, 
the CBE latest legislation yielded a relatively moderate degree of independence, in 
contrast to some developing economies that embarked only recently on reforming their 
CBs aiming at achieving a higher degree of CBI such as Argentina and Peru.22 
    
                                                 
22 The degree of CBI of Argentina and Peru is 18.5 and 17 respectively (out of 19) source: Jacome, 2001 versus 
Egypt’s degree of CBI according to its latest legislation and using the same index 10.   20
In addition, the study demonstrates that the legislative framework of the CBE needs 
major amendments to ensure the CB’s autonomy and to increase its degree of 
independence. Comparing indicators of legal CBI with indicators of actual (behavioral) 
CBI pinpoints certain aspects that need enhancement to increase CBEI by narrowing the 
gap between the CBI conferred by law and that applied in practice.  
 
The first aspect is the limitations on lending to the government, where the legal index 
reveals that although the credit to the government is not discretional but within the 10% 
limit stipulated by law, still it is not confined to emergency cases. This confirms what the 
actual index revealed that the limitations on lending in practice are moderately loose. One 
possible recommendation to rectify this situation is to prohibit the CBE from granting 
direct credit to the government (even within limits), in accordance with the guidelines for 
best practice of CBI. Yet, this may be rather strict for the transition economies, until the 
market for government securities is fully developed (Lybek, 1999). Also, one major flaw 
in the CBE monetary legislation is the absence of limits to the CB mechanism of LOLR, 
which is a potential source of indirect financing to the government during periods of 
financial distress or crises.  
 
The second aspect is concerned with the resolution of conflicts that may arise between 
the CBE and the government. The study reveals that the resolution of conflicts is in favor 
of the government in most of the cases in practice. This is in agreement with what the 
legal index revealed about the government political dominance over the CBE which is 
revealed in the structure of the CBE board of directors. Also, the law does not specify any 
system for conflict management between the CB and the government. One possible way 
to deal with this problem is to establish a clear and open process to resolve any policy 




The concept of CBI underlying this study is the independence to pursue the objective of 
price stability, even at the cost of other objectives that may be more important to the 
political authorities. Thus, the indicators of CBI in this study include institutional, 
political, economic, as well as, measures of the relative importance attached to price 
stability in the central bank law and in practice. 
 
This study quantifies the degree of CBEI since its establishment until 2004. It shows how 
the degree of independence varies through four periods that roughly match with four 
main decades in the Egyptian economy, namely the decade of nationalization and heavy 
state intervention, followed by the decade of open door policy, the decade of reform, and 
finally the decade embarking the economic reform and structural adjustment. 
 
The study uses four indices. The first is the legal index which shows the degree of 
independence that the legislator (government) meant to confer to the CBE by law. The 
other three indicators are behavioural indices, which are very important indices for a 
developing country where the law can be ambiguous or lacking the required enforcement. 
The use of both legal and behavioural indices allows for capturing any divergence   21
between the degree of CBE independence conferred by law and applied in practice. In 
addition, the fact that within two of these indices (legal and questionnaire based index) 
there are several indicators such as financial, political and economic indicators helps to 
pinpoint which indicators require amendment to reinforce the CBEI. In the light of these 
indicators, the study introduces some recommendations for improving the legislations of 
the CBE to enhance the degree of CBEI. 
 
In general, this study concludes (using both the legal and the actual (questionnaire based) 
indices) that the CBE enjoys a moderately low degree of independence, in comparison to 
some Latin American countries who embarked on the institutional reform of their CB 
much more recently during the 1990s and achieved a much higher degree of CBI. Hence, 
the study deduces that the amendment of the CBE law is the key to the institutional 
reform of the CBE. Since the prospects of reforming the CB seem greater with a higher 
degree of legal autonomy and accountability, which arguably generates a larger degree of 
behavioural autonomy and accountability, and increases the likelihood for better financial 
and price stability. Also, the monetary policy should be the sole responsibility of the CB 
if it was to achieve price stability. The government should assure enough legal and actual 
autonomy for the CB by reducing the government dominance in the CBE to give the 
adequate authority to achieve its ultimate target of price stability. . In addition, the CBE 
mechanism as LOLR and the CB limits on lending to the government should undergo 
major enhancement; and the CBE should develop a system for the resolution of conflicts 
that may arise with the political authorities. Finally, the study recommends a system of 
checks and balances to balance the autonomy granted to the CBE. The CBE already has 
sound procedures assuring its transparency and accountability, still the study suggests 
that the legislative authorities monitor the fulfilment of these requirements in practice.  
 
As in similar studies, all the indices used in this study are just attempts to quantify a very 
complex structure and pack it into one number. This process involves subjective or 
arbitrary decisions in coding, classifying, and weighing legal information and in the 
responses to the questionnaire-based index. It must be also noted that CBI is only one of 
the several institutional devices for ensuring price stability. In practice both the CBI and 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
 





CB has the final 




members exist on 
CB board of 
directors 
Ability of CB to 
independently 
appoint some of 
the members on 
the board of 
directors 
(1) No No No 
(2) No Yes No 
(3) Yes Yes No 
(4) Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Alesina, 1988. 
 
 





CB has the final 




members exist on 
CB board of 
directors 
Ability of CB to 
independently 
appoint some of 
the members on 
the board of 
directors 
(1)     (g)
23  No No 
(2) (g) Yes  No 
(3)      (b/g)
 24 Yes  No 
(4)      (b)
 25 Yes  No 
 (5)  (b)  Yes  Yes 


















                                                 
23 g: means that the government solely executes monetary policy 
24 b/g: refers to twin authority(where the authority of formulating the monetary policy is distributed 
between the CB and the government) 
25 b: means that the central bank independently executes monetary policy   25
Table 3: Jacome’s Index of Central Bank Independence and Accountability 
(Criteria, value and weights) 









1- Central bank 
objective (2) 
Preserving price stability is the 
single objective. If more than 
one conflicting objective, 
price stability has priority. 
Multiple conflicting 
objectives without 
establishing price stability 
have priority. 
Multiple objectives 
including growth, an 
orderly development, or 
economic development,   
without priority. 
2- Appointment and 
term of office of the 
members of the 
Central Bank 
Board(2) 
Nominated (appointed) by 
government and appointed 
(confirmed) by Congress Term 
in office exceed or overlap 
government period. 
Nominated and appointed in 
a two-step process for same 
term in office than 
government without 
overlap, or directly for 
longer term. 
Appointed directly by 
the government for the 
same or shorter period 
than the government. 
3- Structure of 
Central Bank Board 
(2) 
No private sector and 
government representatives, 




Minister of Finance with 
vote.  





4- Removal of 
Board members (2) 
Two-step process, with 
qualified majority under 
strictly legal grounds, Final 
decision by Congress or 
Judicial Court. 
Directly by the Executive 
branch under strictly legal 
grounds, or in two-step 
process under non-legal 
basis. 
Removal by the 
Executive branch for 
subjective or political –
not legal- grounds, or 
by the private sector. 
5- Central Bank 
credit to 
government (3) 
No direct credit, except in 
clearly regulated emergency 
situation Or through the 
secondary market, with 
Limitations. 
Direct credit with limits, via 
secondary market without 
limits, through overdrafts, 
or indirectly via public 
banks. 




Emergency loans legally 
regulated, including limits to 
the amount to be granted. 
Emergency loans legally 
regulated, without limits to 
the amount to be granted. 
Discretionary policy for 
emergency loans and 
provisions for bank 
resolution. 
7- Instruments 
independence in the 
conduct of 
monetary policy (3) 
Total independence in the use 
of monetary instruments. 
Government involvement in 
formulation of monetary 
and exchange rate policy. 










Government assures central 
bank capital integrity. Central 
bank transfers profits to the 
government after proper 
provisioning. 
Government not required to 
assure integrity of central 
bank capital, External 
approval of central bank 
budget. 




9-Accountability (1)  Central bank Governor 
appears before Congress and 
reports to government. Report 
disclosed on a timely basis.  
Reports only to the 
government on a regular 
basis or when there are 
monetary disturbances plus 
a manual report. 
Central bank only 
publishes an annual 
report. 
10Transparency 




financial statement certified by 
an external auditor. 
Publishes financial 
statement with the approval 




statement with the seal 
of internal auditor. 
Source: Jacome, (2001)   26







1961-71 1972-82  1983-93  1994-2004 
1- Central bank  
objective (2)  
0.5
  0.5  0.5  1  
2- Appointment 
and term of office 
of the members of 
the Central Bank 
Board(2)  
0
  0 0  0 
3- Structure of 
Central Bank 
Board (2)  
0.5 0.5  0  0.5 
4- Removal of 
Board members 
(2)  
0 1  1  0
 
5- Central Bank 
credit to 
government (3)  
0.5 0.5  0.5  0.5 
6- Leader-of-last-
resort (2)  
0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  
7- Instruments 
independence in 
the conduct of 
monetary policy 
(3)  
0 0.5 0.5  0.5 
8- Financial 
independence (1)  
1 1  1  1 
9- Accountability 
(1)  
0.5  1  1  1  
10- Transparency 
and disclosure of 
financial 
statement(1)  
0.5 1  1  1 
CBI 
(NumericalValue)  
6.5  11  10  10  
 
Source: Computed by the researchers
                                                 








Value   27 





































1- CB objective   0.5
  2  1  0.5  2 1 0.5  2 1 1 2 2 
2- Appointment and term 
of office of the members 
of the CB Board 
0
  2  0 0  2 0  0 2 0 0 2 0 
3- Structure of Central 




1 0.5  2 
 
 
1 0  2 
 
 




4- Removal of Board 
members  
0  2  0 1  2 2  1 2 2 0 2 0 
5- CB credit to 
government  
0.5 3 1.5 0.5 3  1.5  0.5 3 1.5  0.5 3 1.5 
6- Leader-of-last-resort   0.5  2  1  0.5  2 1 0.5  2 1  0.5  2 1 
7- Instruments 
independence  
0 3 0 0.5  3 1.5 0.5 3 1.5  0.5 3 1.5 
8- Financial independence  1  1  1 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 
9- Accountability   0.5  1  0.5  1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 
10- Transparency and 
disclosure of financial 
statement 
0.5  1  0.5  1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 
CBI (=∑ of the weighted 
values of the 10 criteria) 
_ 19  6.5  _  19  11  _ 19  10  _ 19  10 
                                                 
27 Source: Computed by the researchers. 




















Source: Computed by the researchers. 
 
 
                                                 
29 Detailed Explanation of the calculations of the average tenure is presented in Annex 2. 





































































































































































                                                 
31 Source: El Tashreat El Masriah, Presidential Decrees numbers: 
541/1960,1302/1964,583/1967,180/1971,276/1976,97/1982,116/1985,467/1986,378/1993,390/2001,31
3/2003. 
32 Source: www.worldstatesmen.org 
Appointment of the CBE Governor
31  Egyptian  Prime  Minister
32  
 




20 Sept. 1960 
 
Kamal Eldin Hssien 
25 Mar. 1964  Ahmed Zendo (1
st. period)  29 Sept. 1962  Ali Sabry 
6 Feb. 1967  Ahmed nazmy A.Elhamid  3 Oct. 1965  Zakaria MohyEldin 
1 Feb. 1971  Ahmed Zendo (2
nd period)  10 Sept. 1966  Mohamed Sedky Soliman 
19 Mar. 1976  Moh. A.ElFataah Ibrahim  19 Jun. 1967  Gamal Abdel Naser 
27 Feb. 1982  Moh. Amin Shalaby  21 Oct. 1970  Mahmoud Fawzy 
31 Mar. 1985  Ali Negm  17 Jan. 1972  Aziz Sedky 
10 Nov. 1986  Dr.Mahmoud Hamed  26 Mar. 1973  Anwar ElSadat (1
sttime) 
13 Oct. 1993  Ismail Hassan Moh  25 Sept. 1974  Abdel Elaziz Mohamed Hegazy 
30 Oct. 2001  Dr.Mahmoud Abo ElAyon  16 Apr. 1975  Mamdouh Mohamed Salem 
1 Dec. 2003  Dr. farouk Elokda  2 Oct. 1978  Mostafa khalil 
    15 May. 1980  Anwar ElSadat (2
nd time) 
    7 Oct. 1981  Hosny Moubarak 
    2 Jan. 1982  Ahmed Fouad Mohy Eldin 
    17 Jul. 1984  Kamal Hassan Ali 
    4 Sept. 1985  Ali Mahmoud Lotfy 
    10 Nov. 1986  Atef Mohamed Naguib Sedky 
    4 Jan. 1996  Kamal Ganzory 
    5 Oct. 1999  Atef Ebeid 
    14 Jul. 2004  Ahmed Nazef  
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 Little  overlap    1.0 
 Some  overlap    0.5 
 Substantial  overlap    0.0 
 
2  Limitations on lending in practice  0.20   
 Tight    1.00 
 Moderately  tight    0.66 
 Moderately  loose    0.33 
  Loose or nonexistent    0.00 
 
3  Resolution of conflict  0.10   
  Some clear cases of resolution in favor of bank    1.0 
  Resolution in favor of government in all cases    0.0 
 All  other  cases    0.5 
 
4 Financial  independence  0.10   
  a. Determination of the central bank’s budget     
  Mostly central bank    1.0 
  Mixture of bank and executive or legislative branches    0.5 
  Mostly executive or legislative branches    0.0 
 
  b. Determination of the salaries of high bank officials     
 And  the  allocation  of bank profits     
  Mostly by bank or fixed by law    1.0 
  Mixture of bank and executive or legislative branches    0.5 
  Mostly executive or legislative branches    0.0 
 
5  Intermediate policy targets  0.15   
  a. Quantitative monetary stock target     
  Such targets exist; good adherence    1.00 
  Such targets exist; mixed adherence   0.66 
  Such targets exist; poor adherence    0.33 
  No stock targets    0.00 
 
  b. Formal or informal interest rate targets     
 No    1 
 Yes    0 
 
6  Actual priority given to price stability  0.15   
 First  priority    1.00 
  First priority assigned to a fixed exchange rate    0.66 
  Price or exchange rate stability are among the bank’s     
  Objectives, but not first priority    0.33 
  No mention of price or exchange rate objectives    0.00 
 
7  Function as development bank, granting credit at subsidy rate?  0.20   
 No    1.00 
 To  some  extent    0.66 
 Yes    0.33 
  The central bank heavily involved in granting subsidized     
 credits    0.00 
 
Source: Cukierman, et al. (1992). 
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Table 9. CBEI Based on Questionnaire Responses. 
 






























1  Tenure of central bank 




1.0 0.10  0.10  Little 
overlap 
1.0 0.10 0.10 




0.33 0.2  0.066  Moderately 
loose 
0.33 0.2 0.066 
3  Resolution of conflict  Resolution 
in favor of 
government 
in all cases 
0.0 0.10 0  Resolution 
in favor of 
government 
in all cases 
0.0 0.10  0 








- 0.10  - 
  a. Determination of the 
central bank’s budget 
Mostly 
central bank 
1.0 -  -  Mostly 
central bank 
1.0 -  - 
  b. Determination of the 












0.5 -  - 
 Simple  Average  -  (1+0.5)/2  0.10  0.075  -  (1+0.5)/2  0.10 0.075 










- 0.15  - 





0.66 -  -  Such  targets 
exist; good 
adherence 
1.00 -  - 
  b. Formal or informal 
interest rate targets 
Yes 0  -  -  Yes 0  -  - 
 Simple  Average  -  (0.66+0)/2  0.15  0.0495  -  (1+0)/2  0.15 0.075 








0.66 0.15  0.099  First  priority 




0.15 0.66 0.099 
7 Function  as  development 




0.66 0.20  0.132  No  0.20  1.00  0.2 
CBI 
accordin
g to this 
index 
Summation of the seven 
weighted values 
- -  1  0.52  Summation 
of the seven 
weighted 
values 
- 1  0.61 
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1  Tenure of central bank 





0.65 0.10  0.065  Relatively 
little overlap 
0.68 0.10 0.068 




0.4 0.2  0.08  Moderately 
loose 
0.46 0.2 0.092 
3  Resolution of conflict  Resolution 
in favour of 
government 
in all cases 
0.1 0.10  0.01  Resolution 
in favour of 
government 
in most of 
cases 
0.3 0.0 0.03 








- 0.10  - 
  a. Determination of the 
central bank’s budget 
Mostly 
central bank 
0.63 -  -  Mostly 
central bank 
0.74 -  - 
  b. Determination of the 












0.58 -  - 
 Simple  Average  -  (0.63+0.5
3)/2 
0.10 0.058  -  (0.74+0.
58)/2 
0.10 0.066 










- 0.15  - 





0.64 -  -  Such  targets 
exist; good 
adherence 
0.85 -  - 
  b. Formal or informal 
interest rate targets 
Yes 0.2  -  -  Yes  0.07  -  - 
 Simple  Average  -  (0.64+0.2)
/2 
0.15 0.063  -  (0.85+0.
07)/2 
0.15 0.069 








0.56 0.15  0.084  First  priority 




0.64   0.15 0.096 
7 Function  as  development 




0.7  0.20 0.14  No  0.84 0.2 0.168 
CBI 
accordin
g to this 
index 
Summation of the seven 
weighted values 
- -  -  0.5  Summation 
of the seven 
weighted 
values 
- -  0.59 
Source: Computed by the researchers based on questionnaire responses.  
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Figure 2. The Rate of Turnover of the CBE Governors: 
 

























































Figure 3: Categorizing Questionnaire Respondents. 
Number of Respondents
CBE; 13










Annex 1: A brief account of CBE legislations relevant to the legal variables: 
A. Legislations relevant to the first decade: 
 
1.  According to article 1 in law 163 year 1957 [Credit and Banks Law] amended by 
law 250/1960(which was in its turn amended by law 277/same year). The NBE ( 
latter the CBE according to law 250/1960) is responsible for organizing and 
executing the credit and monetary policy according to the state’s plan, and 
according to what supports the national economy and assures monetary stability.[ 
Multiple conflicting objectives without the establishment that price stability has 
priority.] 
 
2.  According to articles 2 and 3 of law 163/1957 the governor and his deputy are 
appointed for five renewable years by a presidential decree. Also, two 
representatives of the ministries of Finance and Economy are appointed by the 
ministerial decrees. The rest of the board is elected by the General Assembly 
(dominated by government representatives) for five years. Thus, the governor and 
CBE board are appointed by the government, but their term in office is not 
directly related to the term of the government in force (can overlap with other 
governments). However, law 2336/1960 article 22 amended law 1957 by stating 
the governor, his deputy, and the rest of the board members are appointed by the 
President for 3 years. 
 
3.  According to articles 2 and 4(b) of law 163/1957 which states that the board of the 
CB constitutes of a governor and a vice-governor and number of members of the 
board which does not exceed seven but not less than three (article 4(b) 
representatives should not have any benefit with any of the banks governed by this 
law), also, the board should include representatives of the Finance and Economic 
ministries with equal rights and power as other members of the board. As well as, 
law 17/1965 amending law 250/1960 that articulates that CB board consists of a 
governor and a deputy, two representatives of Ministry of Economics and Foreign 
Trade and a Ministry of Treasury, and CEO’s of commercial and specialized 
banks (all public banks due to nationalization laws), or their representatives, and 
three financial or monetary specialists appointed by the president upon the 
nomination of the Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade. 
 
4.  Law 163/1957 and article 22 of law 2336 for year 1960 (amending law 163) 
articulated the conditions for the appointment of CB board; however, it does not 
stipulate any regulations for the dismissal of the governor or any of the board 
members.  
 
5.  Article 15 in law 163/1957 stipulates CB can extend credit to the government to 
finance seasonal deficit in the budget, within a limit of 10% of the average 
revenue of the preceding three fiscal years. Therefore, CB extends direct credit 
with limits. 
 
6.  Article 50 of law 163/1957 stipulates that CBE can extend loans to banks in Case 
of financial disturbance or emergency, the conditions and terms of which are 
determined by the board and with collateral stipulated by the board. No limits for  
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the loan are indicated by the law. [Article 15 of law 2336/1960 stipulates exactly 
the same stated above]. 
 
7.  Article 48 of law 163/1957 states that the CBE sets the interest and discount rates 
according to the nature of transactions. It is understood that these rates should be 
within the limits set by the civil law. 
 
8.  According to article 4 of law 2336/1960 the government assures CB capital 
integrity by allowing the use of reserves for capitalization up to the levels 
stipulated by law.  
 
9.  According to article 12 of law 250/1960 the CB reports only to the government 
(Minister of Economics and Central Council of Money and Credit) on a regular 
basis, besides disclosing an annual report. 
 
10. Article 11 of law 250/1960 stipulates that CB publishes financial statement with 
approval of a public sector auditor appointed by the Minister of Economics. 
 
B. Legislations relevant to the second decade: 
 
1.  Law 120/1975 article 14 states that until there is a presidential decree stating the 
Basic Order of the CB is issued the Basic order stipulated by law 2336/1960 
remains in effect, so the objective of the CB remains unchanged since 1960.   
2.  According to law 120/1975 article 6 stipulates that the governor and his vice and 
three specialized members of the board are appointed by the president for four 
renewable years. 
3.  Law 120/1975 article 6 states that the CB board of directors is composed of a CB 
governor, a deputy, the chairmen of different public sector banks, two 
representatives on behalf of both of the ministry of Treasury and ministry of Trade 
and Economic Cooperation (each appointed by his minister) and three specialists 
on financial, legal, and monetary affairs. 
4.   Article 6 of law 120/1975 states that the governor can not be dismissed during his 
term in office. As for the board members no article of that law deals with their 
dismissal. (Thus applying this indicator is relative to the governor only.) 
5.  No article of that law120/1975 deals with CB credit to the government. Thus law 
1957 applies in accordance with article 27 law 1975 which dictates the appliance 
of law 163/1957 in case of the absence of any regulations. 
6.  No article of that law120/1975 deals with CB role as lender of last resort. Thus 
law 1957 applies in accordance with article 27 law 1975 which dictates the 
appliance of law 163/1957 in case of the absence of any regulations. 
7.  According to article 1 of law120/1975, the CBE executes (but not sets) and 
supervises the monetary and credit policy according to the government’s plan, 
however, article 7 of the same law frees CB from the limits on the use of 
monetary policy instruments (Free to set interest and discount rates), still the 
government involvement prevails). 
8.  Article 23 of law 120/1975 states explicitly that the net profits of the CB and 
public sector banks are transferred to the Treasury after deduction of the necessary 
reserves  
      (which assures the CB capital integrity).  
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9.   According to law 120/1975 articles 12 and 13 of the law stipulate that upon three 
months of the end of the fiscal year the CB discloses the balance of profits and 
losses, the CB budget signed by the governor and the certified accountants, and 
discloses other financial and economic reports to the government. Also, CB is 
obliged to disclose an annual report about the monetary and credit conditions of 
Egypt to the people’s assembly three months after the end of the fiscal year. 
10. Law 120/1975 article 11 stipulates that the Central accounting authority appoints 
and sets the fees of two auditors to review the accounts of the CB on yearly basis. 
 
C. Legislations relevant to the third decade: 
 
1.  No amendment to the objectives during the 1980s. 
2.  No amendment to the appointment and term in office during the 1980s. 
3.  The structure of the CB board stipulated in law 120/1975 was amended by law 
50/1984, the major change was including a representative of the Business Sector 
and two Chairmen from the banking sector (not necessarily from the public 
sector). 
4.  No amendments occurred to the following criterion, so law 120/1975 still applied.   
5.  No amendments occurred to the following criterion, so law 163/1957 still applied.    
6.  No amendments occurred to the following criterion, so law 120/1975 still applied.   
7.  No amendments occurred to the following criterion, so law 120/1975 still applied.   
8.  Article 23 of law 50/ 1984 states explicitly that the net profits of the CB and 
public sector banks are transferred to the Treasury after deduction of the necessary 
reserves (This assures capital integrity). 
9.  No amendments occurred to the following criterion. 
10. No amendments occurred to the following criterion. 
 
 
D. Legislations relevant to the final decade: 
 
1.  Article 5 of law 88/2003 stipulates that CB’s objective is achieving price stability 
and integrity of financial system within the framework of the country’s general 
economic policy. 
2.  Article 10 of law 88/2003 the people’s assembly has no role in the appointment of 
the CB board or the governor, and the term in office for the governor is four 
renewable years. None of the board members is nominated by the governor except 
the two deputies to the governor which are nominated by him and appointed by 
the President.    
3.  Although article 3 sub articles 6 of law 37/1992 includes two chairmen from the 
banking sector and increased the number of representatives of the business sector 
in the CB board to two, yet law 88/2003 (amending law 1992 ) excludes the two 
business sector representatives and the two bank chairmen
33. 
4.  Articles 10, 11, and 12 of law 88/2003 stipulates the conditions for appointment of 
CB board, however, it does not stipulate any regulations for the dismissal of the 
governor or any of the board members. 
5.  Article 27 law 88/2003 still puts limit on CBE credit to the government. 
6.  Articles 7 and 8 of law 88/2003 allow CB to extend credit and emergency loans to 
banks without stipulating limits. 
                                                 
33 It must be noted that in practice the CB board members include representatives from the private 
sector ( two chairmen of  private banks)  
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7.  According to article 5 law 88/2003 CB sets the monetary policy objectives with 
accord with the government and then executes the monetary and credit policy. 
There is no mention in the law that CB is free to set the reserve requirement and 
interest rate. 
8.  Article 3 of law 59/1993 raised the CBE’s capital adequacy to 100 million LE and 
article 4 necessitated the establishment of legal reserves equal to 100% of the 
CB’s capital and allows the CB board to make additional reserves out of the 
annual net profits. Also, article 22 of law 88/2003 stipulates the net profits of the 
CB would be transferred to the Treasury after deducting the required reserves. 
9.  Article 21 law 88/2003 stipulates that the financial statements as well as, the 
auditors report and the annual report are disclosed to the president, the Prime-
Minister, the Shura Council, and the People’s Assembly. 
10. Article 19 of law 88/2003 stipulates that external auditors are appointed by the 





Annex 2: Calculating the Rate of Turnover of the CBE Governors: 
 
First Method: Average Turnover Rate (= average number of changes in CB governors 
per year) 
 
First Period (1961-1971): 
 
 
Second Period (1972-1982): 
 
Governor 
(Term in office according to fiscal years) 
Average turnover (= no. of changes per year) 
Dr.Elrafie 
(1960/61-64) 
4 years tenure=0.25 
Mr.Zendo 
(1964/65-67) 
3  years tenure=0.33 
Mr.Nazmy 
(1967/68-71) 
4 years tenure=0.25 
Average Turnover of the first 
period(=average no. of changes a year) 
=no. of changes in CB governors/no. of years 
in period=3/11=0.27 
Governor 
(Term in office according to fiscal years) 




5 years tenure=0.2 
Mr.Ibrahim 
(1976/77-82) 
6 years tenure=0.16 
Average  Turnover  of the second period 
(=average no. of changes a year) 
=no.of changes in CB governors/no. of years 
in period=2/11=0.18  
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Third Period (1983-1993): 
 




Notes on the calculations: 
Periods are calculated as fiscal years, where each governor is assumed to begin his term in 
office at the beginning or mid of the fiscal year for simplicity in calculation. For example, it is 
assumed that Mr. Nazmy ended his term in office in 30/6/1971 and Mr. Zendo started his 
(second) term in office at the beginning of the fiscal year 71/72 in 1/7/1971. This assumption 
also allows for avoiding double counting the last year in the tenure of one governor and the 
first year in the tenure of the succeeding governor. 
The method used above in calculating the average turnover of the period corresponds with 
another method which takes the weighted average turnover of each governor. This method 
explained below assumes each year is divided into two sub periods which corresponds to the 





(Term in office according to fiscal years) 
Average  turnover (= no. of changes per year) 
Mr.Shalaby 
(1982/83-85) 
3  years tenure=0.33 
Mr.Negm 
(1985/86-86) 
1 year tenure=1 
Mr.Hamed 
(1986/87-93) 
7 years tenure=0.14 
Average  Turnover of the third period 
(=average no. of changes a year) 
=no.of changes in CB governors/no. of years 
in period=3/11=0.27 
Governor 
(Term in office according to fiscal years) 




8 years tenure=0.125 
Dr.Abou-elEyoun 
(2001/2002-2003) 
2 years tenure=0. 5 




Average  Turnover of the  fourth period 
(=average no. of changes a year) 
=no.of changes in CB governors/no. of 
years in period=2/10=0.2  
  40
Second Method: Weighted Average Method 
 
First Period (1961-1971): 
 
 
                                                 
34 The average tenure of the last (and current) governor, Mr. El Oukda, is not calculated as it remains unknown for 




















of CB  
Governor  
averag









of CB  
Governor  








of CB  
Governor  








of CB  
Governor  








0.25    Mr.Zendo  
(1972-76)  
0.2    Mr.Shalab
y  
(1983-85)  
0.33    Mr.Hassan  
(1994-2001)  





0.33  0.27  Mr.Ibrahi
m  
(1976-82)  
0.16  0.18  Mr.Negm  
(1985-86)  
1  0.26  Dr.Abou-
elEyoun  
(2001-2003)  





0.25    Mr.Shala
by  
(1982-)  
0.33    Mr.Hamed  
(1986-93)  








0.2            Mr.Hassa
n  
(1993-)  
         
Governor 
(Term in office 
according to fiscal 
years) 
Average  Turnover (= 
no. of changes per 
year) 
Term spent  in office during first 




of each governor 
Dr.Elrafie 
(1960/61-64) 
4 years tenure=0.25  * 7/22  =0.079545 
Mr.Zendo 
(1964/65-67) 
3 years tenure=0.33  *6/22  =0.09 
Mr.Nazmy 
(1967/68-71) 
4 years tenure=0.25  *8/22  =0.0909 
Mr.Zendo 
(1971/72-) 




Average  Turnover  
of the first period 
=summation of 
weighted average   
turnover 





Second Period (1972-1982): 
 
 




(Term in office 
according to 
fiscal years) 
Average    Turnover 
(= no. of changes 
per year) 
Term spent  in office during  second 




of each governor 
Mr.Zendo 
(1972-76) 
5 years tenure=0.2  * 9/22  =0.081818 
Mr.Ibrahim 
(1976/78-82) 
6 years tenure=0.16  *12/22  =0.0872727 
Mr.Shalaby 
(1982/83-) 
3 years tenure=0.33  *1/22  =0.015 
Average 
Turnover  of the 
second period 
=summation of 
weighted average   
turnover 





(Term in office 
according to fiscal 
years) 
Average    Turnover 
(= no. of changes 
per year) 
Term spent  in office during  third 




of each governor 
Mr.Shalaby 
(1983-85) 
3 years tenure=0.33  * 5/22  =0.075 
Mr.Negm 
(1985/86-86) 
1 year tenure=1  *2/22  =0.0909 
Mr.Hamed 
(1986/87-93) 
7 years tenure=0.14  *14/22  =0.08909 
Mr.Hassan 
(1993/94-) 
8 years tenure=0.125  * 1/22  =0.005681 
Average  
Turnover  of the 
third period 
=summation of 
weighted average   
turnover 











The Following Questionnaire aims to help quantify the status of actual Central Bank 






Indicator  Period 1983-1993  Period 1994-2004 
 
 
1.In your opinion the term of 
office of the central bank 
governor and that of the 




a)  Little overlap 
b)  Some overlap 




a)  Little overlap 
b)  Some overlap 
c)  Substantial overlap 
 
2. According to your 
judgment the limitations of 
the Central bank on lending 
(to the government) in 
practice is: 
 
a)  Tight 
b)  Moderately tight 
c)  Moderately loose 
d)  Loose or non-existent 
 
 
a)  Tight 
b)  Moderately tight 
c)  Moderately loose 
d)  Loose or non-existent 
 
 
3. Do you think that the 
resolution of conflicts 
between the central bank and 
political authorities (the 
government) indicate? 
 
a)  Some clear cases of 
resolution in favor of the 
central bank 
b)  resolution in favor of the 
government in all cases 
c)  all other possibilities of 
resolution 
a)  Some clear cases of 
resolution in favor of the 
central bank 
b)  resolution in favor of the 
government in all cases 
c)  all other possibilities of 
resolution 
                                                 
35 In fourth period the entire period is 19 (not 22) where the 9 years (1994-2002)*2 (each year is calculated as 2 
sub periods) =18 + 1 sub period of last year (2003).  
Governor 
(Term in office 
according to fiscal 
years) 
Average  Turnover (= 
no. of changes per 
year) 
Term spent  in office 





of each governor 
Mr.Hassan 
(1994-2001) 
8 years tenure=0.125  * 15/19  =0.09868421 
Dr.Abou-elEyoun 
(2001/2002-2003) 
2 years tenure=0. 5  *4/19  =0.105263157 
Mr. El Oukda 
(2003/2004-) 
 
_ _  _ 
Average    Turnover 


















4a. Do you believe that the 
determination of the central 
bank's budget is done:  
 
a)  mostly by the central bank 
b)  by mixture of the central 
bank and executive or 
legislative authorities 
c)  mostly by executive or 
legislative branches 
a)  mostly by the central bank 
b)  by mixture of the central bank 
and executive or legislative 
authorities 




4b. The determination of the 
salaries of high central bank 
officials and the allocation of 
bank profits are done 
 
a)  mostly by the central bank 
b)  by mixture of the central 
bank and executive or 
legislative authorities 
c)  mostly by executive or 
legislative branches 
a)  mostly by the central bank 
b)  by mixture of the central bank 
and executive or legislative 
authorities 
c)  mostly by executive or 
legislative branches 
5a. Do you believe that the 
central bank’s adherence to a 
quantitative monetary target 
is   
 
a)  strong 
b)  moderate 
c)  poor or non-existent 
 
a)  strong 
b)  moderate 
c)  poor or non-existent 
 
5b. Do interest rate targets 
(formal or informal) exist? 
 
a)  Yes 
b)  No 
a)  Yes 
b)  No 
6. The actual policy 
objective of the central bank 
of Egypt gives  
 
 
a)  First priority to price 
stability 
b)  First priority to a stable 
exchange rate. 
c)  Price or exchange rate 
stability is among the 
bank's objectives but not 
first priority. 
d)  Price or exchange rate 
stability are not among the 
central bank’s objectives 
a)  First priority to price stability 
b)  First priority to a stable 
exchange rate. 
c)  Price or exchange rate 
stability is among the bank's 
objectives but not first 
priority. 
d)  Price or exchange rate 
stability are not among the 
central bank’s objectives 
7. Do you agree that the 
central bank functions as a 
development bank granting 
loans at subsidy rates? 
 
a)  No 
b)  To some extent 
c)  Yes 
d)  The central bank is heavily 
involved in granting 
subsidy credits 
a)  No 
b)  To some extent 
c)  Yes 
d)  The central bank is heavily 
involved in granting subsidy 
credits 
 
 